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INTELLIGENT DESIGN IN PUBLIC UNIVERSITY SCIENCE
DEPARTMENTS: ACADEMIC FREEDOM OR
ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION
Frank S. Ravitch*
INTRODUCTION
In recent years issues surrounding intelligent design theory in the public schools
have come to the fore.' Intelligent design theory (ID) devolved/evolved from the
creation science movement,2 itself a descendent of creationism.3 Most of the cases
involving creation science or ID concern either the direct teaching of the subject in
public secondary school science courses4 or the use of disclaimers when evolution is
taught which state that it is only a theory and often allude to creation science, crea-
tionism, or ID.' Yet, a number of "experts" cited by ID proponents are professors
at public universities.6 While some of these experts are in philosophy or religion
* Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. The author is grateful
to Lane Dilg, Stephen Feldman, Chip Lupu, Ken Marcus, Bill Marshall, Robert Tuttle, and
William Van Alstyne, fellow participants in the symposium. I am also grateful to Joy A.
Thompson and the staff of the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal for their excellent
organization and professionalism in planning this symposium. Finally, I am grateful to Colin
Boes and Adrienne Whitehead for their excellent research assistance. Any errors in this Article,
are of course, mine alone.
See, e.g., Selman v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 449 F.3d 1320 (1 th Cir. 2006); Kitzmiller
v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
2 See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 718-21; ROBERT T. PENNOCK, TOWER OF BABEL:
THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE NEW CREATIONISM 28-31 (1999). The irony in the phraseology
preceding this note is very much intended.
3 Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 718-20; PENNOCK, supra note 2, at 28-31.
4 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (holding that Louisiana's "balanced
treatment act," which required creation science be taught if evolution is taught, violated the
Establishment Clause).
5 Selman, 449 F.3d at 1324; Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 708-09.
6 The International Society for Complexity, Information, and Design (ISCIDC) lists,
among others, the following public university professors as fellows: Walter Bradley (mechanical
engineering), Texas A&M University; J. Budziszewski (philosophy and political theory),
University of Texas, Austin; John Angus Campbell (communications), University of Memphis;
Russell W. Carlson (molecular biology), University of Georgia, Athens; Kenneth de Jong
(linguistics), Indiana University, Bloomington; Daniel Dix (mathematics), University of South
Carolina; Fred Field (linguistics), California State University; Guillermo Gonzalez (astronomy),
Iowa State University; James Keener (mathematics and bioengineering), University of Utah;
Robert C. Koons (philosophy), University of Texas, Austin; Stan Lennard (medicine),
University of Washington; Scott Minnich (microbiology), University of Idaho; Martin Poenie
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departments, others are in science departments, including biology.7 The question
naturally arises whether these universities can preclude such professors from teaching
or researching ID as faculty members in a science department. There is also the
question of whether allowing these individuals to teach ID in the science curriculum
is an establishment of religion. Related to both of these questions is the query of
whether ID theory can be considered science in regard to these issues.
In Part I, this Article suggests that universities may determine that ID is not science
and thus preclude professors from teaching it in university science departments. Such
a determination has significant doctrinal and philosophical implications. Science
departments may also consider research by ID theorists under their general tenure
policies, which usually require a tenure candidate to have been published in peer
reviewed journals and the evaluation of a tenure candidate's scholarship by outside
evaluators in the relevant scientific field (i.e., biology, chemistry, geology, astronomy,
etc.). If the scholarship is deemed inadequate by such experts, the department, col-
lege, and/or university may take whatever action is normally taken where evaluators
find scholarship lacking in quality or depth. This does not preclude the possibility that
such work might be appropriate in a religion or philosophy department. In Part II,
this Article suggests that teaching ID in a public university science department may
pose Establishment Clause problems depending on the specific facts involved. Ques-
tions of academic freedom and free speech generally are highly relevant in addressing
these issues.
(molecular cell and developmental biology), University of Texas, Austin; Carlos E. Puente
(hydrology and theoretical dynamics), University of California, Davis; Henry F. Schaefer
(quantum chemistry), University of Georgia, Athens; Jeffrey M. Schwartz (psychiatry and
neuroscience), UCLA; Philip Skell (chemistry), Penn State University; Frederick Skiff
(physics), University of Iowa; and Karl D. Stephan (electrical engineering), Southwest Texas
State University. The International Society for Complexity, Information and Design Society
Fellows, http://www.iscid.org/fellows.php (last visited Jan. 21,2008). Several of these names
also appear on the Discovery Institute's Center for Science and Culture website. Discovery
Institute's Center for Science and Culture, http://www.discovery.org/csc/fellows.php (last
visited Jan. 28, 2008). It is possible that some of the people listed on the ISCIDC website do
not realize that the organization is heavily focused on ID, given the ISCIDC's savvy marketing
and description of purpose on its website, but when one looks closely at the organization it
is hard to miss ISCIDC's central focus on ID and related issues.
' For example, the Discovery Institute's Center for Science and Culture lists the following
as fellows of the center and supporters of ID theory: Scott Minnich, a microbiologist at the
University of Idaho; Dean Kenyon, a professor-emeritus of biology at San Francisco State
University; and Henry F. Schaefer III, a professor of chemistry at the University of Georgia.
Discovery Institute, http://www.discovery.org/csc/fellows.php (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
A number of these individuals are also on the ISCIDC list of fellows, which includes other
biologists and chemists. See supra note 6. Neither the Discovery Institute's nor the ISCIDC's
list of fellows includes everyone who could be listed. The lists are meant to be illustrative of
the fact that there are a number of faculty members at public universities whom ID theorists
cite as supporting the theory or aspects of it.
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I. ACADEMIC FREEDOM, CURRICULAR NEEDS, AND DISCIPLINARY BOUNDARIES
The ability of public universities to preclude the teaching of ID in science classes
might seem clear to some. Similarly, the ability of a science department at a public
university to deny research support for, or deny tenure to, those whose research is
primarily focused on ID might seem equally clear. Yet, the questions raised by these
scenarios are not as easy to answer as they may appear to be at first glance. In order
to answer these questions we must determine whether ID is science. If so, it might
be hard to exclude ID from the curriculum, at least in upper level electives, although
the courts do give significant deference to university curricular decisions.8 If ID is
not determined to be science, the deference given by courts to departmental and
university curricular decisions would enable university officials to keep ID out of
science courses.9
This still leaves open the question of public university support for research on
ID. Here, the courts tend to suggest more deference to the academic freedom of the
faculty member.' ° Of course, even this academic freedom is not boundless." For
example, one would not expect that a geology department would have to credit, fund,
or otherwise support research arguing that the earth is flat. Nor would an astronomy
department have to credit or support research attempting to prove (but not disprove)
that our solar system is the center of the universe. Yet, as a theoretical matter, one
may argue that in precluding such work one is favoring a particular paradigm for
science over other possible paradigms. 2 This argument raises significant philo-
sophical questions, 3 but as will be explained, it does not help ID theorists despite
its superficial appeal. 4
This Part will first explore the legal and philosophical debate over whether ID
is science, religion, or something else. In doing so, it is necessary to address the mean-
ing and nature of science itself. Next, this Part will explore whether the teaching
of ID can be excluded from a public university science program. Finally, this Part
will address whether ID research must be supported or credited by public university
science departments. Answering the first question goes a long way towards answering
the second and third questions.
8 See infra Part I.B.
9 See infra Part I.B.
10 See infra Part I.C.
1 See infra Part I.C.
12 See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed.
1996) (discussing paradigms in the sciences).
1 These questions are addressed infra at Part I.A.
'4 See infra Part I.A.
1063
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1061
A. ID: Religion, Science, or Religious Science?
Is intelligent design theory science, religion, or both? Proponents of lID argue that
ID is science and that-at least on its face-it is not religion." Yet, when probed
further about who the "intelligent designer" might be, the answer is generally G-d
or some sort of unnamed supernatural force. 16 Does this make ID religion? Does it
preclude ID from being science? One court that explored the issue in depth held that
ID is not science and that it is a religiously grounded theory. 17 As will be set forth
below, this seems a correct result, especially given the evidence before the court.
Still, the answer relies on current scientific paradigms-i.e., the scientific method.
In Kitzmiller v. DoverArea School District, a federal district court had the oppor-
tunity to address the question of whether ID theory is religion or science. 8 The court
heard testimony from leading philosophers of science,19 biologists,2 and ID propo-
nents.2' After hearing all of this testimony and evaluating documentary evidence,
such as manuscripts of an ID textbook that was virtually identical to a creation science
text with "intelligent designer" substituted for G-d and "intelligent design" for
"creation,"22 the court held that ID is not science, and it is a religiously grounded
theory. The court's holding that ID is a religiously based theory and not a scientific
theory was an important aspect of the decision for a number of reasons but especially
because the Supreme Court had already held in Edwards v. Aguillard that religiously
based theories of creation (in Edwards "creation science") could not be taught in
public school science classes without running afoul of the Establishment Clause.23
In Kitzmiller, theologians and philosophers of science testified that ID theory is
not a scientific theory and is a religious theory. Recounting the testimony of Dr. John
Haught, the court stated:
We initially note that John Haught, a theologian who testified
as an expert witness for Plaintiffs and who has written extensively
on the subject of evolution and religion, succinctly explained to
the Court that the argument for ID is not a new scientific argu-
ment, but is rather an old religious argument for the existence of
'5 See The Discovery Institute, Centerfor Science and Culture, http://www.discovery.org/
csc/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2008); The International Society for Complexity, Information, and
Design Center, http://www.iscid.org (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
16 See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 718-22 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
17 See id. at 735.
18 400 F. Supp. 2d 707.
'9 Id. at 719, 721, 735-36.
20 Id. at 724-25, 727-29, 737-38, 740, 743-44.
21 Id. at 718-23,735-45.
22 Id. at 721-22.
23 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
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God. He traced this argument back to at least Thomas Aquinas in
the 13th century, who framed the argument as a syllogism: Wher-
ever complex design exists, there must have been a designer;
nature is complex; therefore nature must have had an intelligent
designer. Dr. Haught testified that Aquinas was explicit that this
intelligent designer "everyone understands to be God." The syllo-
gism described by Dr. Haught is essentially the same argument
for ID as presented by defense expert witnesses Professors Behe
and Minnich who employ the phrase "purposeful arrangement
of parts."
Dr. Haught testified that this argument for the existence of
God was advanced early in the 19th century by Reverend Paley
and defense expert witnesses Behe and Minnich admitted that
their argument for ID based on the "purposeful arrangement of
parts" is the same one that Paley made for design. The only appar-
ent difference between the argument made by Paley and the argu-
ment for ID, as expressed by defense expert witnesses Behe and
Minnich, is that ID's "official position" does not acknowledge
that the designer is God. However, as Dr. Haught testified, anyone
familiar with Western religious thought would immediately make
the association that the tactically unnamed designer is God.24
Another example of this testimony:
Robert Pennock, Plaintiffs' expert in the philosophy of science,
concurred with Professor Haught and concluded that because its
basic proposition is that the features of the natural world are pro-
duced by a transcendent, immaterial, non-natural being, ID is a
religious proposition regardless of whether that religious propo-
sition is given a recognized religious label. It is notable that not
one defense expert was able to explain how the supernatural
action suggested by ID could be anything other than an inherently
religious proposition.2"
Moreover, experts on scientific education reinforced this testimony when dis-
cussing the disclaimer at issue in the case:
[The second] paragraph [of the disclaimer] singles out evolution
from the rest of the science curriculum and informs students that
24 Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 718.
25 Id. at 721.
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evolution, unlike anything else that they are learning, is "just a
theory," which plays on the "colloquial or popular understanding
of the term ['theory'] and suggest[ing] to the informed, reasonable
observer that evolution is only a highly questionable 'opinion'
or a 'hunch."' Immediately after students are told that "Darwin's
Theory" is a theory and that it continues to be tested, they are told
that "gaps" exist within evolutionary theory without any indication
that other scientific theories might suffer the same supposed weak-
ness. As Dr. Alters [the only science education expert to testify
at trial] explained this paragraph is both misleading and creates
misconceptions in students about evolutionary theory by misrep-
resenting the scientific status of evolution and by telling students
that they should regard it as singularly unreliable, or on shaky
ground. Additionally and as pointed out by Plaintiffs, it is indeed
telling that even defense expert Professor Fuller agreed with this
conclusion by stating that in his own expert opinion the dis-
claimer is misleading. Dr. Padian [an expert for plaintiffs]
bluntly and effectively stated that in confusing students about
science generally and evolution in particular, the disclaimer
makes students "stupid.
26
Even the ID theorists' top witnesses and their leading textbook had a hard time
explaining how ID is science and not religiously grounded:
Moreover, it is notable that both Professors Behe and Minnich
[two leading defense experts] admitted their personal view is
that the designer is God and Professor Minnich testified that he
understands many leading advocates of ID to believe the designer
to be God.
Although proponents of the ID [movement] occasionally sug-
gest that the designer could be a space alien or a time-traveling
cell biologist, no serious alternative to God as the designer has
been proposed by members of the ID [movement], including
Defendants' expert witnesses. In fact, an explicit concession
that the intelligent designer works outside the laws of nature and
science and a direct reference to religion is Pandas' [the leading
ID textbook] rhetorical statement, "what kind of intelligent agent
was it [the designer]" and answer: "On its own science cannot
answer this question. It must leave it to religion and philosophy."27
26 Id. at 725 (citation omitted).
17 Id. at 718-19.
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One of the most problematic pieces of evidence for the ID proponents is the
"Wedge Document." 28 The Wedge Document is essentially the game plan of the
Discovery Institute, the leading supporter of ID theory.29 The document makes clear
that ID theory is essentially a way to get the Christian view of creation back into
public school science classrooms after the defeat of "creation science" in Edwards
v. Aguillard.30 The document reads more like a marketing strategy than the basis for
a scientific school. This was not lost on the court in Kitzmiller:
Dramatic evidence of ID's religious nature and aspirations is
found in what is referred to as the "Wedge Document." The
Wedge Document, developed by the Discovery Institute's Center
for Renewal of Science and Culture (hereinafter "CRSC"), repre-
sents from an institutional standpoint, the ID [Movement]'s goals
and objectives, much as writings from the Institute for Creation
Research did for the earlier creation-science movement.... The
Wedge Document states in its "Five Year Strategic Plan Summary"
that the ID [Movement]'s goal is to replace science as currently
practiced with "theistic and Christian science." As posited in
the Wedge Document, the ID [Movement]' s "Governing Goals"
are to "defeat scientific materialism and its destructive moral,
cultural, and political legacies" and "to replace materialistic ex-
planations with the theistic understanding that nature and human
beings are created by God." The CSRC expressly announces, in
the Wedge Document, a program of Christian apologetics to pro-
mote ID. A careful review of the Wedge Document's goals and
language throughout the document reveals cultural and religious
goals, as opposed to scientific ones. ID aspires to change the
ground rules of science to make room for religion, specifically,
beliefs consonant with a particular version of Christianity.3 '
In the end, the Kitzmiller court held that the disclaimer involved in that case, as
well as the other events surrounding that disclaimer including the acquisition of ID
textbooks for the school library, violated the endorsement test3 2 and the purpose and
effects prong of the Lemon test,33 and thus violated the Establishment Clause.' This
aspect of the holding will be discussed in greater detail below. 5
28 Id. at 720, 737.
29 Id. at 720.
30 Cf. id. at 720-22, 737.
31 Id. at 720 (citations omitted).
32 Id. at 714-35.
3 Id. at 746-64.
34 Id. at 765.
35 See infra Part II.
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Of course, the decision of a federal district court does not have the precedential
value of an appeals court decision, but the careful analysis of the district court on the
science/religion issue will likely be followed by many courts because it is the first
decision directly addressing the issue in the ID context and because so many leading
figures on both sides of the issue testified at trial.36 The behavior of the school board
involved in Kitzmiller, however, was so brazen that courts might use that behavior
to distinguish some of the Establishment Clause analysis in the case-although given
the district court's reasoning, the case would have come out the same even without
the brazen behavior of the school board.37 Yet, that behavior was not the primary
focus of the court's analysis on the science/religion issue.38 It is that issue that was
key to the ultimate outcome in Kitzmiller and that is key to the analysis in this Article.
If ID is not science, as accepted by the broader scientific community, and it is a
religiously based theory, as found by the court in Kitzmiller and as reflected in many
of the ID movement's own documents and statements, what arguments remain for
ID theorists? After all, if ID is not science, it need not be taught or recognized by
science departments at universities39 and in fact, as explained below, could be kept
out of the science classroom. 4 As will be seen, the best remaining argument for ID
theorists ultimately works against considering ID "science."
ID theorists have attempted to argue, although frequently without much sophis-
tication, that reliance on the current scientific paradigm excludes religious or other
paradigms from competing.41 If such alternative paradigms are to gain any accep-
tance, the argument goes, it is essential that they be explored by researchers at the
university level. This raises the related question of whether such arguments for
alternative scientific paradigms must be credited by university science departments.
The first issue has serious philosophical implications. The second issue serious legal
and educational implications. Yet, as will be seen, regardless of the answer to the
first question, the answer to the second question is "no."
The possibility of multiple scientific paradigms was addressed in depth by Thomas
Kuhn in his seminal work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.42 At first glance,
it may appear that ID theorists could use the notion of multiple scientific paradigms
to argue that religiously based-or at least supernaturally based-paradigms should
be considered "science," despite such alternate paradigms' failure to use the scientific
36 See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
31 Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 746-63.
38 See id. at 720-23, 735-45.
39 Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991).
40 Id.; see infra Part I.B.
41 See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 736-37; PENNOCK, supra note 2, at 37-39; The
Discovery Institute Center for Science and Culture, Academic Freedom Page, http://www
.discovery.org/csc/freeSpeechEvolCampMain.php (last visited Jan. 21, 2008).
42 KUHN, supra note 12, passim (discussing paradigms in the sciences and asserting that
there is no super-paradigm to decide between conflicting paradigms).
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method to analyze their ultimate conclusion. The scientific method itself would only
be a tool of particular paradigms for science under this analysis. Of course, this
argument would allow alchemy, ufology, and astrology to be considered science as
well. In fact, a leading I) proponent admitted as much when he testified in Kitzmiller
regarding ID theory.43 One would hardly expect that chemistry departments would
accept alchemy as an appropriate teaching or research field. Nor would one expect
an astronomy department to credit teaching or research focused on astrology (one can
imagine the Dionne Warwick space telescope instead of the Hubbell).
Kuhn's arguments, however, demonstrate that ID would not have a place as a
"scientific" paradigm and would not be accepted by any community of credible scien-
tists even if it were considered a "scientific" paradigm." In fact, while at a superficial
level it might be argued that Kuhn's approach would support the potential inclusion
in "science" of paradigms that are not based in traditional scientific approaches, when
one reads his work it quickly becomes apparent that quite the opposite is true.45 Even
within Kuhn's description of scientific paradigms and revolutions, there is a presumed
substantive boundary for what can be called science, even if in narrower terms that
boundary may shift.' Astrology, ID, and the belief that the Earth is the center of the
universe are all precluded from "science" because they do not use the tools, quanti-
tative analysis, or methodology of science in regard to their ultimate hypothesis. In
fact, if any of the three might have ever been "science" in the current sense of that
term, it would be the third.47 Most importantly, even if ID could somehow be called
a scientific, as opposed to theological or philosophical, paradigm, it need not and
has not been accepted by the community of scientists.48 In fact, Kuhn specifically
addresses the fact that not all paradigms will be accepted by the scientific commu-
nity,49 that the scientific community does determine what science is, 50 and that there
are specific ways in which a new paradigm might come to be accepted by the
4" Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 736.
44 See KUHN, supra note 12, at 153-54 (linking the likelihood of success of a new para-
digm to quantitative superiority over an old paradigm); id. at 167-69, 177-78 (emphasizing
the importance of acceptance by the scientific community to the success of a paradigm); id. at
205-07 (giving a list of criteria that distinguish old paradigms from recent ones).
41 See id.
4' See KUHN, supra note 12, passim. Kuhn repeatedly draws links between science and
philosophy or religion. See e.g., id. at 78, 88. He discusses successful scientific revolutions
as occurring through the use of the tools and problems of "normal science," thus resulting in
new scientific paradigms, but new paradigms must build on or improve previous theories to
gain acceptance. Id. at 144-59.
4" At the time it was widespread, the Flat Earth theory at least corresponded with the
physical observations of scientists of the time, but this view was based on perceptions of what
was possible in the natural world.
48 Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 735-45; PENNOCK, supra note 2, at 37-39.
4' KUHN, supra note 12, at 18-19.
50 Id. at 177-78.
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scientific community or some subset of it.5' ID, even if it proclaims itself to be a
scientific paradigm, has not gained acceptance among credible scientists or scientific
journals and is not part of the discourse of the mainstream sciences.52
Still, in arguing for academic freedom, an ID theorist might ask how do we know
that a given paradigm is "the" paradigm for a given science unless there is some super-
paradigm that allows us to choose between competing paradigms. As Kuhn points
out, there is no such super-paradigm. 3 I have used a similar analysis in critiquing
the concept of neutrality in the religion clause context.54 Still, as noted above, Kuhn
argues that there are still criteria for "what" can be counted as science,55 and ID does
not meet these criteria.56 Perhaps more importantly, when courts address questions
of academic freedom within a given discipline, the metaphysical question implicitly
gives way to the more basic question of whether the disciplinary boundaries within
a given field can be maintained while allowing for robust academic freedom.57 Of
course, since ID cannot even verify its claims that it is science within the Kuhnian
world of shifting scientific paradigms, the legal questions are even easier to answer.
Kuhn's work at most suggests that a theory like ID may have been a paradigm
for science-alchemy was arguably based in a scientific paradigm at one point in
history-but its methodology and presumptions are so far out of line with mainstream
scientific thought that it cannot create a ripple, let alone a shift, in current scientific
paradigms.58 The reason for this is that ID theory is unwilling or unable to question
its ultimate hypothesis of the existence of an intelligent designer, and it has failed to
engage in experiments that could support or contravene evolution. ID works toward
a predetermined end to disprove evolution, at least as to more complex life forms.' °
It is quite possible that alternative theories can gain acceptance within a discipline
by using the tools of that discipline (as well as interdisciplinary tools) to convincingly
make the case for such theories.6 ' In fact, this is the way that Kuhn suggests most new
paradigms come to be accepted.62 Many ID theorists seem upset about their failure
1' Id. at 167-69.
52 Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 735-45; PENNOCK, supra note 2, at 37-39.
53 KUHN, supra note 12, at 150-58.
"4 See FRANK S. RAVrrCH, MASTERS OFILLUSION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE REuGION
CLAUSES 13-36 (2007); Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Neutrality:
Broad Principles, Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REv. 489,498-523
(2004).
5' KUHN, supra note 12, at 153-54, 167-69, 177-78, 205-07.
56 Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 718-23, 735-45; PENNOCK, supra note 2, at 37-39.
57 See infra Parts I.B., I.C.
58 KUHN, supra note 12, at 94, 129-30, 145-47, 153-54, 167-69, 177-79, 206-07.
59 PENNOCK, supra note 2, at 177-79.
60 See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 735-45.
61 See KUHN, supra note 12, at 94, 129-30, 145-47, 153-54, 167-69, 177-79, 206-07.
62 id.
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to gain acceptance among credible scientists,63 but as noted above, this is heavily
a result of their failure to test their ultimate hypothesis-that there is an intelligent
designer-through the scientific method.' The failure to do so suggests that ID should
be explored in the humanities, if at all, where philosophy and religious studies leave
ample room to explore such questions. 65 This failure, however, excludes ID from
science departments that do not wish to credit it.'
This is not to say that academic freedom within the sciences is less robust than
in other fields. A good example of a highly controversial theory that has gained a
good deal of acceptance while also garnering a good amount of skepticism is the field
of string theory in physics.6 7 Of course, one reason the theory is so controversial is
that it is hard to falsify based on real world observations-string theory is primarily
a set of mathematical models supported by some real world research.6" Of course,
string theorists do not use this to avoid the scientific method. Rather, they have en-
deavored to analyze (i.e., prove or disprove) their theories by using more and more
sophisticated experiments and equipment.69 One of the most recent examples of these
attempts is the CERN Large Hadron Collider being built in Switzerland.7° It will be
larger than the current giant atom smasher used by string theory proponents, which
is located at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory in the United States.7 '
ID theorists, of course, do no such thing.72 There is no attempt to verify the
existence of the intelligent designer through scientific experiments. There is simply
an attempt to prove the designer's existence by using concepts such as irreducible
complexity-the notion that some biological phenomenon such as the human eye or
a bat's ability to fly could not exist as the result of evolution, because if you remove
one part, the entire function falls apart-to demonstrate the existence of the designer.73
63 E.g., The Discovery Institute, Center for Science and Culture, Academic Freedom,
http:/ www.discovery.org/csc/freeSpeechEvolCampMain.php (last visited Jan. 19, 2008).
' Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 737-38.
65 Id. at 718-19, 746.
6 Id. at 735-45; see also Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (holding that
a university-issued memorandum prohibiting professors from discussing religious beliefs or
preferences does not violate free speech).
67 See BRIAN GREENE, THE ELEGANT UNIVERSE: SUPERSTRINGS, HIDDEN DIMENSIONS,
AND THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE THEORY (1999).
68 See Keay Davidson, "Theory of Everything" Tying Researchers up in Knots, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 14, 2005, at A6.
69 GREENE, supra note 67, at 222, 383-84.
70 For reasonably up-to-date information on the Large Hadron Collider, see European
Organization for Nuclear Research, Large Hadron Collider, http://public.web.cem.ch/public/
en/LHC/LHC-en.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2008).
7' For reasonably up-to-date information on the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory,
see Fermilab, http://www.fnal.gov (last visited Jan. 19, 2008).
72 See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707,735-45 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
13 Id. at 738-44; PENNOCK, supra note 2, at 263-72.
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Virtually every example ID theorists provide for irreducible complexity has been
countered by modem science.74 For example, it is well understood, based on the
fossil record and experiments, that some biological functions resulted from changes
in the function of a specific body part.75 Thus, all parts of complex biological functions
need not have evolved initially to serve that function.76 There are many examples of
such complex systems in nature and in the fossil record.77 Yet, ID theorists do not
generally acknowledge this research, except to state that it is wrong. 7 They do not
attempt to falsify their fundamental principles.79
String theory is the ultimate foil for the claims of ID theorists because it has
become an accepted paradigm among many theoretical physicists, even as others
have suggested that the inability to falsify it makes string theory more philosophy
than science.80 As noted above, string theorists do not respond by saying, "we don't
need to prove the existence of strings because they are so well demonstrated by
nature." They argue that strings are well demonstrated by phenomenon in the phys-
ical universe,"1 but at the same time they acknowledge that until they can prove their
ultimate hypothesis through experimentation, they may be going down a path that will
prove to be wrong. 2 In fact, the reason string theory became generally accepted was
because of the complex mathematical calculations that support it, as well as the many
real world phenomena it seems to explain. 3 Without the math, however, no one
would have bought it.84 Whether string theory ultimately results in a paradigm that
is accepted by the community of physicists will be based on its ability to use the tools
of that community to demonstrate and convince others that it is superior to earlier
paradigms. 5
The evolution of string theory itself is practically a page out of Kuhn's work.
After some initial promise, it became more marginalized as quantum mechanics (the
study of the very small, such as atoms, in physics) and cosmology (generally con-
nected more with relativity and the study of larger phenomena in the universe) went
in other directions.86 After years of complex mathematical computations, the theory
7' Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 734-38; PENNOCK, supra note 2, at 263-72.
71 See PENNOCK, supra note 2, at 109-16.
76 id.
77 Id. at 109-10.
78 Id. at 263-72.
79 Id.
80 See, e.g., GREENE, supra note 67, at 212-15; Davidson, supra note 68.
81 See, e.g., GREENE, supra note 67, at 4-5.
82 Id. at 384-86; Davidson, supra note 68.
83 See generally GREENE, supra note 67, at 15-20 (describing string theory as "the Unified
Theory of Everything" and discussing the current state of string theory).
' Cf. KUHN, supra note 12, at94, 145-47,153-54,167-69, 177-79,206-07 (suggesting
that without some persuasive evidence that can be accepted by the community of scientists,
new scientific paradigms are unlikely to be persuasive or to lead to a scientific revolution).
83 See id.
86 GREENE, supra note 67, at 3-6, 136-40.
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had a rebirth of sorts and became quite popular.17 It was said to merge things on the
quantum level and relativity-i.e., it merged gravity with the three fundamental forces
of quantum mechanics.8" This led to an explosion of work in the area that created
several mathematical models that seemed inconsistent with each other.89 This was,
of course, problematic if the theory was to actually unify relativity and quantum
mechanics. It was also problematic because these models required ten space-time
dimensions instead of the generally accepted four dimensions. 0 Yet, the calcula-
tions made sense, and extra dimensions, particularly at the quantum level, explained
a number of natural phenomena. 9' Then, Professor Ed Witten determined that the
various mathematical models could actually gel because they were all reflections
of the same phenomenon in various contexts.92 This led to the revelation that there
is an eleventh dimension in string theory.93 The eleventh dimension solved a
number of problems in the theory and also allowed its broader application at the
level of cosmology.94
The problem remained, however, that all of this was hard to prove or falsify in
the physical world.95 The mathematical calculations were complex and meticulous,
but did they explain anything real? Some physicists argued that unless string theory
is falsifiable, it is not science but rather philosophy. 6 String theorists responded that
the calculations themselves could be falsified,97 but moreover, that until string theory
is proven or falsified in the real world through experimentation, the verdict is out
on its validity.98 They then set out to prove or disprove the real world validity of
string theory.99 Other physicists suggest this is impossible,"° but that, of course, is
87 Id. at 139-40.
88 See generally GREENE, supra note 67, passim (explaining the basics of superstring
theory).
89 Id. at 283-306.
90 Id. at 203.
9' Id. at 184-227.
92 Id. at 308-19.
93 Id. at 203-04.
94 Id. at 308-19.
9' Id. at 383-87.
96 See KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE (5th ed. 2002) (classic text addressing Popper's theories on science); LEE SMOLIN,
THE TROUBLE WITH PHYSICS: THE RISE OF STRING THEORY, THE FALL OF A SCIENCE, AND
WHAT COMES NEXT xii-xxii (2006).
97 See GREENE, supra note 67, at 283-97,306 (noting the meticulous path of string theory
calculations and the importance of the fact that they ultimately worked out); id. at 308-19
(discussing the importance of Witten's M-Theory in uniting previously conflicting versions
of string theory).
98 Id. at 20, 383-87.
99 Id. at 222, 383-87.
'00 See SMOLIN, supra note 96, at xiv.
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a question of the ability of technology to prove it.'' If technology can not prove it,
string theory will be seen as a dead end. 0 2 If it can, then the debate will likely rage
on. 0 3 Thus, even the most borderline (between philosophy and science) scientific
theories still must prove themselves using the scientific method in order to prevail.
B. Teaching Intelligent Design
There is a significant amount of case law holding that public university officials
may insist that professors teach within the stated curriculum."° It is equally clear
that within the curriculum, professors are accorded a great deal of academic free-
dom;0 5 although there are some limitations."° Some of these cases involve professors
'o GREENE, supra note 67, at 222, 383-87.
102 Id. at 20.
103 Id.
'0o See, e.g., Edwards v. Cal. U. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[A] public
university professor does not have a First Amendment right to decide what will be taught in
the classroom."), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1143 (1999); Keen v. Penson, 970 F.2d 252, 257
(7th Cir. 1992) ("This Court has recognized the supremacy of the academic institution in
matters of curriculum content."); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11 th Cir. 1991)
(noting that university officials may control curriculum decisions); Scallet v. Rosenblum, 911
F. Supp. 999, 1011 (W.D. Va. 1996) (recognizing that schools have a right to determine their
own curriculum which must be followed), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997); Cooper v.
Ross, 472 F. Supp. 802, 809 (E.D. Ark. 1979) ("[A] state university has the undoubted right
to prescribe its curriculum, to select its faculty and students and evaluate their performances,
and to define and maintain its standards of academic accomplishment.").
"05 See, e.g., Keysihian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,603 (1967) ("Our Nation is deeply
committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and
not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.");
Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671,679 (6th Cir. 2001) (involving a professor using
profane language; however, because the course was one dealing with interpersonal communi-
cation, the court found the course to be within the ambit of the curriculum despite the univer-
sity's protests), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 970 (2002); Vanderhurst v. Colo. Mountain Coll. Dist.,
208 F.3d 908, 913 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that academic freedom is a "special concern" of
the First Amendment); Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1075 (noting that there is a strong recognition of
academic freedom as it relates to the First Amendment); Scallet, 911 F. Supp. at 1014 (noting
the importance of academic freedom).
1"6 See, e.g., Edwards, 156 F.3d at 491 (noting that, while a professor may advocate for
a change in the curriculum outside the classroom, the professor may not use those materials
in the classroom); Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley Coll., 92 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 1996)
(acknowledging the potential limitations on academic freedom), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1140
(1997); Keen, 970 F.2d at 257 (recognizing there may be conflicts between academic freedom
and control over the curriculum that require some limiting of academic freedom); Bishop, 926
F.2d at 1077 (recognizing that the university's interest in having its courses taught without
religious bias outweighed the countervailing concerns related to academic freedom within
the curriculum); Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1972) ("[W]e do not conceive
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inserting their religious views into courses unrelated to religion."°7 In the end, courts
have held that courses at public universities are so connected with the educational
function of these institutions that university officials have a right to enforce "legiti-
mate pedagogical interests" as to the general substance of courses.° 8 These interests
either outweigh any claims of academic freedom asserted by professors °9 or are said
to be invalid when it comes to teaching (at least in the core curriculum). 10 Thus,
academic freedom to be a license for uncontrolled expression at variance with established
curricular contents and internally destructive of the proper functioning of the institution. First
Amendment rights must be applied in light of the special characteristics of the environment in
the particular case."), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973); Scallet, 911 F. Supp. at 1014 (noting
that not all speech will implicate the First Amendment and academic freedom).
107 Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1075; see also Edwards, 156 F.3d at 490 (involving courses un-
related to religion on educational media being taught with a religious bias). Other cases related
to academic freedom and curriculum dealt with secular concerns. For example, one prominent
case dealt with, among other things, a professor's in-class discussions relating to diversity in a
first-year required writing course. Scallet, 911 F. Supp. at 1003-04. The court found that,
despite the fact that the issue was one of public concern, the university's interest in a consis-
tent curriculum outweighed the professor's First Amendment rights and his speech was not
protected. Id. at 1017.
108 See, e.g., Vanderhurst, 208 F.3d at 914 ("[W]hether [the] termination reasonably related
to the College's legitimate pedagogical interests is the test for determining whether [the] speech
fell within the ambit of First Amendment protection."); Scallet, 911 F. Supp. at 1016, 1011
(noting that a professor's use of certain materials violated the university's legitimate peda-
gogical interests; however the case also notes that the pedagogical concerns are less forceful
at the university level than at lower educational levels such as high school); Silva v. Univ. of
N.H., 888 F. Supp. 293, 314 (D.N.H. 1994) (recognizing a right to protect valid pedagogical
purposes, but finding the policy in this case too subjective to merit protection).
1"9 See, e.g., Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 802-03 (6th Cir.) (involving the use of
profanity during class by a professor and finding that the interests of the professor were out-
weighed by the university's concerns), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 951 (2001); Bishop, 926 F.2d
at 1076 (recognizing the university's interest in having its courses taught without religious
bias outweighed the countervailing concerns related to academic freedom within the curric-
ulum); Scallet, 911 F. Supp. at 1016-17 (recognizing a balancing test, and in this case the
professor's interest was outweighed by the university's interest in having its curriculum taught
without significant disruption). But see, e.g., Hardy, 260 F.3d at 682 (discussing a situation
where the college's pedagogical interests did not outweigh the activities and speech of the
professor); Cohen, 92 F.3d at 972. While the lower court in Cohen found that the professor's
interest in teaching the controversial material was outweighed by the university's interest in
effective education as determined by its curriculum, the appellate court found that the univer-
sity's policies in this regard were too vague to be enforceable. Id.
"0 See, e.g., Edwards, 156 F.3d at 491 (finding it unnecessary to inquire further into the
issue of the First Amendment standard given at the trial level, because "a public university
professor does not have a FirstAmendment right to decide what will be taught in the classroom"
(emphasis added)); Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 585 (5th Cir. 1986) (determining that the
First Amendment concerns related to academic freedom did not apply, as the language in
question was unrelated to the subject matter of the class); Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705,
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arguments for including ID in the science curriculum based on "equal access" or
"formal neutrality" in the aid context are inapposite here, because there is no public
or limited public forum and there is no facially neutral program of "private choice."'I
This is further backed by the argument above that ID is not science, because even if
there were a limited public forum in this context-and there is not-that forum would
be limited to "science" courses in the science curriculum.' 2
At one level this is a bit disturbing to academics like myself. I had thought that
academic freedom was quite broad in the classroom both as a matter of law and
policy, but reading the cases, it seemed more and more like this is true as a matter
of policy, but not necessarily as a matter of law. Yet, the ascendance of ID theory
suggests there are reasons why the courts have ruled as they have. Most of the cases
do not involve garden variety teaching disputes." 3 They more frequently involve
either overt sexualized or profane statements in courses that do not touch on sex or
profanity in any way, or they involve the insertion of material that may run contrary
to the focus of the courses involved.' Many of the cases involve required courses
as opposed to electives, and the professors involved frequently teach primarily at the
undergraduate level.' "'
The most relevant of these cases for present purposes is Bishop v. Aronov,
decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit." 6 Bishop
708 (6th Cir.) (determining that a university may dismiss a professor based on disagreements
with the professor's "pedagogical attitudes"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973).
"' See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (formal neutrality); Good News
Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (equal access).
112 See supra Part I.A.
"' See, e.g., Hardy, 260 F.3d at 675 (involving the use of profane language in the class-
room); Vanderhurst, 208 F.3d at 911 (involving a series of profane and offensive remarks
unrelated to the curriculum); Edwards, 156 F.3d at 490 (involving courses being taught with
a religious bias); Cohen, 92 F.3d at 972 (involving intentionally shocking discussions regard-
ing profane language and controversial topics including cannibalism and consensual sex with
children); Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1076 (involving a university's concern that courses not be
taught with a religious bias).
"4 See, e.g., Hardy, 260 F.3d at 675 (involving profane language and using such terms as
"nigger" and "bitch" during class discussions on social deconstructivism); Bonnell, 241 F.3d
at 803 (involving use of profanity during class by a professor); Vanderhurst, 208 F.3d at 911
(outlining a series of vulgar/offensive remarks the professor made unrelated to the course
material or, in many cases, any educational purpose whatsoever); Cohen, 92 F.3d at 972
(involving profane language and controversial topics which were arguably outside the curric-
ulum of the class); Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1068 (inserting religious material/perspective into a
course which did not deal with religion, but instead with science); Martin, 805 F.2d at 583-84
(involving profanity in the classroom).
" See, e.g., Scallet v. Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999, 1003 (W.D. Va. 1996) (involving a
required communications course and a professor inserting his opinions on matters outside the
core course curriculum), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997).
116 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991).
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was a professor in the Department of Health, Physical Education, and Recreation
in the College of Education at the University of Alabama, where he taught exercise
physiology." 7 He was also the director of the college's Human Performance Labora-
tory. "' The university issued Bishop a letter requiring him to abstain from inserting
religious statements in his teaching." 9 The subject matter of Bishop's statements,
as attested to by him in an affidavit, included remarks like the following:
I want to invest my time mainly in people. I personally believe
God came to earth in the form of Jesus Christ and he has some-
thing to tell us about life which is crucial to success and happiness.
Now this is simply my personal belief, understand, and I try to
model my life after Christ, who was concerned with people, and
I feel that is the wisest thing I can do. You need to recognize as
my students that this is my bias and it colors everything I say and
do. If that is not your bias, that is fine. You need, however to,
filter everything I say with that (Christian bias) filter. 2°
Bishop also organized an after-class event for his students and others who were
interested at which he lectured about the "Evidences of God in Human Physiology."' 2 '
The session was held shortly before exams, and the university felt this may have
placed pressure on students to attend.'22 Although Bishop utilized a blind grading
system, the university did not think he adequately separated the out-of-class event
from the course itself.123 The university would have allowed him to hold such an
event if it was not seen as being associated with the course, but the university saw
no such separation between the course and the after-class event in this case. 2
4
The court held that a university classroom is not a public forum for speech. 25
Thus, the university has the right to determine what substance is appropriate in the
curricular context, so long as it has legitimate pedagogical interests for doing so. 126
This must be done through case-by-case analysis. 27 In Bishop, the university had
valid concerns regarding the relevance of the professor's religious statements to a
course in exercise physiology. 28 Bishop had the freedom to hold events on his views
"7 Id. at 1068.
118 Id.
"9 Id. at 1069.
120 Id. at 1068.
121 Id. at 1068-69.
122 Id. at 1076.
23 Id. at 1069.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 1071.
126 Id. at 1074.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 1076.
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of G-d's role in human physiology on campus so long as those events were not
connected to his courses. '29 Thus, Bishop was not denied the freedom to discuss his
religious convictions, he was only denied the ability to outwardly do so in the manner
that he had in his exercise physiology course. 30
The key issue was the department, college, and university's right to control
curriculum based on legitimate pedagogical interests.' 3' In this case, those interests
included concerns about the pedagogical effects of students feeling religiously co-
erced in a basic physiology course.'32 The notion of legitimate pedagogical interests
was taken from a line of cases involving secondary schools.'33 The court acknowl-
edged that it was borrowing from these secondary school cases; although those cases
would have to be adapted to the university setting:
3 4
In an effort to calibrate the Constitution in this case ... we
consider the context: the university classroom during specific
in-class time and the visage of the classroom as part of a univer-
sity course in an after-class meeting. This context also leads us
to consider the coercive effect upon students that a professor's
speech inherently possesses and that the University may wish to
avoid. The University's interest is most obvious when student
complaints suggest apparent coercion-even when not intended
by the professor.
Second, it follows, we consider the University's position as
a public employer which may reasonably restrict the speech rights
of employees more readily than the [sic] those of other persons.
As a place of schooling with a teaching mission, we consider the
University's authority to reasonably control the content of its cur-
riculum, particularly that content imparted during class time....
Last and somewhat countervailing, we consider the strong
predilection for academic freedom as an adjunct of the free speech
rights of the First Amendment. There are abundant cases which
acclaim academic freedom.1
35
In holding that the University had not violated Bishop's free speech rights, the
court stated:
129 Id.
130 Id. at 1076-77.
131 Id.
132 Id.
113 Cf id. at 1074 (using cases that relied on "legitimate pedagogical interests" language,
but not using that exact language as set forth in those cases).
134 Id. at 1074.
,35 Id. at 1074-75.
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Though we are mindful of the invaluable role academic
freedom plays in our public schools, particularly at the post-
secondary level, we do not find support to conclude that academic
freedom is an independent First Amendment right. And... we
cannot supplant our discretion for that of the University. Federal
judges should not be ersatz deans or educators. In this regard,
we trust that the University will serve its own interests as well as
those of its professors in pursuit of academic freedom. University
officials are undoubtedly aware that quality faculty members will
be hard to attract and retain if they are to be shackled in much
of what they do.'36
The court did acknowledge that the university did not have the right to preclude
Bishop from engaging in independent research on such topics.137
In the context of ID in the science curriculum, one can glean from the cases
that university officials, as well as departmental curriculum committees, can ex-
clude the teaching of ID if they choose to.'38 The same would be true regarding
astrology, alchemy, etc. In addition to the balancing test from Bishop, courts have
based such holdings directly on the secondary school cases' 39 -determining whether
the university's decision is based on legitimate pedagogical concerns and whether
the course in question is seen as university speech, 140 which most courts hold it
136 Id. at 1075 (emphasis added).
13 Id. at 1076-77; see infra Part I.C.
138 Based on the case law, public universities have a fairly wide latitude to determine what
will be taught. In this context, excluding ID from the science curriculum is in line with other
curricular decisions. Cf. Edwards v. Cali. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998)
("[A] public university professor does not have a First Amendment right to decide what will
be taught in the classroom."), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1143 (1999); Keen v. Penson, 970 F.2d
252, 257 (7th Cir. 1992) ("This Court has recognized the supremacy of the academic
institution in matters of curriculum content."); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (1 lth
Cir. 1991) (noting that university officials may control the curriculum decisions); Scallet v.
Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999, 1011 (W.D. Va. 1996) (recognizing that the schools have a
right to determine their own curriculum which must be followed), cert. denied, 521 U.S.
1105 (1997); Cooper v. Ross, 472 F. Supp. 802, 809 (E.D. Ark. 1979) ("[A] state university
has the undoubted right to prescribe its curriculum, to select its faculty and students and
evaluate their performances, and to define and maintain its standards of academic accom-
plishment."). The ability of a university to control science curriculum appears to be especially
true as it pertains to ID and science, as at least one prominent decision has determined that
ID is not science. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
"9 See, e.g., Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671,678 (6th Cir. 2001) (reviewing
a number of secondary school cases to support its determination), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 970
(2002); Vanderhurst v. Colo. Mountain Coll. Dist., 208 F.3d 908, 913 (10th Cir. 2000)
(same); Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1072-74 (same); Scallet, 911 F. Supp. at 1016-17 (same).
"a See, e.g., Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 75 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing on what basis
a university may regulate professors based on its own pedagogic concerns over academic
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is, 4 ' and thus distinguishable from cases involving private speech.142 Other courts
have based their decisions on the cases involving the free speech rights of teachers
for out-of-class speech or the speech rights of government employees generally.'43
These courts generally weigh the interests of the government employee as a private
citizen in "commenting on matters of public concern" against the interest of the gov-
ernment as employer in promoting its interests.'" Still others apply both approaches.'45
freedom); Vanderhurst, 208 F.3d at 914 ("[W]hether [the] termination reasonably related to
the College's legitimate pedagogical interests is the test for determining whether his speech fell
within the ambit of First Amendment protection."); Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1074 ("[E]ducators
do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content
of student [or professor] speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." (quoting Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,272 (1998))); Scallet, 911 F. Supp. at 1014 (determining that
the speech in question was seen as university speech); Silva v. Univ. of N.H., 888 F. Supp. 293,
314 (D.N.H. 1994) (recognizing a right to protect valid pedagogical purposes, but finding the
policy in this case too subjective to merit protection).
14' See, e.g., Edwards, 156 F.3d at 492 (noting that in this case regulation of the speech was
allowed because the university, through the professor, could be considered the speaker and
could make decisions as to the content of its own derivative speech); Bishop, 926 F.2d at
1071 (recognizing the university has an interest in the professor disseminating his beliefs under
the guise of university instruction); Scallet, 911 F. Supp. at 1014 (holding that the speech is
university speech).
142 See, e.g., Edwards, 156 F.3d at 492 (discussing why a university may control a private
individual's speech where it is done in a manner which makes it, in reality, university speech);
Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1073 ("While a student's expression can be more readily identified as
a thing independent of the school, a teacher's speech can be taken as directly and deliberately
representative of the school. Hence, where the in-class speech of a teacher is concerned, the
school has an interest not only in preventing interference with the day-to-day operation of its
classrooms as in Tinker, but also in scrutinizing expressions that 'the public might reasonably
perceive to bear [its] imprimatur."'); Scallet, 911 F. Supp. at 1014 (finding that the speech in
question was public not private). But see Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 811 (6th Cir.)
(involving a case of mixed private and public speech), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 951 (2001).
,' See, e.g., Vanderhurst, 208 F.3d at 913-14 (discussing the free speech rights of a public
school teacher); Levin v. Harleston, 966 F.2d 85,88 (2d Cir. 1992) (focusing on the free speech
rights of the professor in question).
'" See, e.g., Brown, 247 F.3d at 75 (finding that the professor's contentions regarding the
grading policy were not matters of public concern); Hardy, 260 F.3d at 679 (focusing on
aspects of the speech related to speaking on a matter of public concern); Dambrot v. Cent.
Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1188 (6th Cir. 1995) (focusing on whether the speech was a matter
of public concern); Blum v. Schlegel, 18 F.2d 1005, 1011 (2d Cir. 1994) (involving, in part,
whether or not a law school professor's advocating for legalized marijuana was a matter of
public concern); Keen v. Penson, 970 F.2d 252, 258 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing the balancing
of comments on matters of public concern, but failing to find the speech was a matter of public
concern in this particular case); Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583,584-85 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting
that the test for matters involving public employees is whether their speech touched on a matter
of public concern).
'" See, e.g., Bonnell, 241 F.3d at 812 (primarily using a public concern approach, but also
discussing the rights of public employees); Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1072 (discussing both the free
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Whether a public university would run afoul of the Establishment Clause if it did
allow ID to be taught in the science curriculum will be addressed in Part II.
A somewhat analogous scenario might prove helpful. Imagine a law professor
who teaches a course on agriculture and law. The professor does not teach anything
directly about the law relating to agriculture. Instead the professor teaches seed biol-
ogy and uses this to demonstrate that the relevant law is "wrong." This is not done
by teaching the law in a critical fashion-approaching it from a variety of angles,
including its incongruence with seed biology-but rather by using seed biology to
attack gaps in the legal framework rather than by addressing the framework as a
whole. One might expect that after a student complaints the law school might suggest
that the professor teach the course in the agriculture school, if that school wants such
a course, but not at the law school. The same could be true of courses in intelligent
design. A university can insist that such courses be taught in the philosophy or religion
departments, if those departments want, but not in the biology department.'46
It is important to note that the level of curricular control accorded university
officials may limit the paradigms that can be taught in certain courses. However, in
most cases this will not be so, because most new scientific paradigms will support
themselves from within previous scientific paradigms and will simply be taught as
new theories. 47
C. Research on ID Theory in Public University Science Departments
While the case law is quite clear about the right of university officials and faculty
committees to affect the substance of certain courses despite academic freedom con-
cerns, the case law is not so clear regarding the university's role in research. Bishop
acknowledges that academic freedom is far greater when it comes to research.'48
Yet we know that in hiring, tenure, promotion, and merit increase decisions in the
sciences much depends on the researcher's publication output, ability to get grants
from recognized granting sources, and professional reputation among peers. It is also
speech rights of government employees generally and the weighing of interests on matters of
public concern); Marinoff v. City Coll. of N.Y., 357 F. Supp. 2d 672 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (same);
Scallet, 911 F. Supp. at 1014 (same).
146 Cf. Edwards, 156 F.3d at 491 ("[A] public university professor does not have a First
Amendment right to decide what will be taught in the classroom."); Keen, 970 F.2d at 257
("This Court has recognized the supremacy of the academic institution in matters of curric-
ulum content."); Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1076 (noting that university officials may control the
curriculum decisions); Scallet, 911 F. Supp. at 1011 (recognizing that the schools have a right
to determine their own curriculum which must be followed); Cooper v. Ross, 472 F. Supp. 802,
809 (E.D. Ark. 1979) ("[A] state university has the undoubted right to prescribe its curriculum,
to select its faculty and students and evaluate their performances, and to define and maintain
its standards of academic accomplishment.").
147 KUHN, supra note 12, at 94, 129-30, 145-47, 153-54, 167-69, 177-79, 206-07.
148 Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1076-77.
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clear that ID theorists are not generally published in mainstream science journals,
their work is not highly regarded (if regarded at all) by scientific peers, and their
ability to get grants from mainstream granting institutions is basically nonexistent. 4 9
Thus, two questions naturally arise. First, despite the academic freedom to pursue
ID research, can science departments choose not to recognize that research as mean-
ingfully aiding the department's research interests---either substantively through grants
and publications or reputationally? Relatedly, could a science department simply
exclude ID research from any support or recognition? In other words, could a science
department simply decide that ID is not science, and therefore that ID research has
no place in a science department (or using the name of such a department)? Second,
could a science department revoke the tenure of a faculty member who, post-tenure,
engages only in ID research and refuses to teach courses that do not include ID?
As will be seen, the answer to the first question is yes, but the answer to the
second question is far more complex. There is a vast difference in tenure revocation
policies among universities, 50 but if the faculty member is willing to teach his or
her assigned courses without focusing on ID (assuming it is not appropriate to the
courses) and he or she is willing to engage in appropriate service activities, such as
committee work, etc., "for cause" tenure revocation would not, and should not, be
allowed under most university policies. 51 It is one thing to deny merit increases and
research support to a faculty member because his or her ID research is essentially
useless to a department, but it is quite another to revoke a faculty member's tenure
because he or she is engaged in "junk theory" outside of his or her teaching and service.
Unless a department is willing to revoke tenure for all non-productive researchers,
it seems problematic to revoke tenure because of what is essentially an outside hobby
(since it would not count as scholarship). This seems a logical balance given most
149 Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 737-38, 744-45 (M.D. Pa.
2005).
15o See, e.g., Donna R. Euben & Barbara A. Lee, Faculty Discipline: Legal and Policy Issues
in Dealing with Faculty Misconduct, 32 J.C. & U.L. 241,251 (2006) (describing some of the
various ways in which universities sanction tenured professors, including revocation, and the
various standards applied); Michael Olivas, Review ofSteven G. Poskanzer's Higher Education
Law: The Faculty, 30 J.C. & U.L. 225 (2003) (providing an overview of some cases dealing
with tenure revocation and the various ways with which it is dealt). Compare Kansas State
University Handbook, § C 31.5 (dealing with tenure revocation), available at http://www.k-
state.edu/academicservices/fhbook/fhsecc.html#31.5, with University of New Mexico Faculty
Handbook, § 6.2.2(b) (dealing with dismissal of tenured faculty), available at http://www.unm
.edu/-handbook/newhb.html, and University of Georgia Policy for Review of Tenured Faculty,
available athttp://www.uga.edulprovost//polproc/revtefac.html, and Michigan Technological
Institute, Academic Tenure & Promotion policy, available at http://www.admin.mtu.edu/
admin/boc/policy/ch 16/chl 6p4.htm. The above examples demonstratejust some of the wide-
ranging variances in tenure policies.
5 ' Cf STEVEN G. POSKANZER, HIGHER EDUCATION LAW: THE FACULTY 208-17 (2002)
(explaining circumstances under which "for cause" tenure revocation is generally done).
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university policies. A science department could deny any support for ID research
(including the use of the department, college, and university name) and give no
credit for it in terms of research productivity, but such a department should not treat
an ID theorist differently from any other non-productive researcher in terms of
tenure revocation.
The first question above involves no special First Amendment analysis. If ID
is not science, science departments have no duty to fund it any more than a science
department would have a duty to fund a professor's art collection. A department or uni-
versity would also have the ability to require that its name not be used in connection
with the work. For example, if a faculty member wants to engage in a partisan polit-
ical blog or a blog promoting drug use, a public university would have the right to
refuse the faculty member resources for the blog and to require that the university
name not be used to promote the blog. I"2 This is not required, but the university may
do so. The same would be true with ID theory.
The credit issue is even easier to deal with. Science departments, like other
departments, need not support or reward research that does not meet the basic criteria
set for such support or reward.'53 If an ID researcher cannot place work in accepted
152 It is likely that such a decision would fall under the ambit of decisions which involve
universities' right to determine the curriculum and thus implicitly for which activities it will
provide funding. Cf. Edwards v. Cali. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488,491 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[A]
public university professor does not have a First Amendment right to decide what will be
taught in the classroom."), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1143 (1999); Keen v. Penson, 970 F.2d
252,257 (7th Cir. 1992) ("This Court has recognized the supremacy of the academic institution
in matters of curriculum content."); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1076 (11 th Cir. 1991)
(noting that university officials may control curriculum decisions); Scallet v. Rosenblum, 911
F. Supp. 999, 1011 (W.D. Va. 1996) (recognizing that the schools have a right to determine
their own curriculum which must be followed), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997); Cooper
v. Ross, 472 F. Supp. 802, 809 (E.D. Ark. 1979) ("[A] state university has the undoubted right
to prescribe its curriculum, to select its faculty and students and evaluate their performances,
and to define and maintain its standards of academic accomplishment.").
"53 See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401,410 (4th Cir. 2000) (determining that a Virginia
statute limiting access to sexually explicit material for research did not violate the academic
freedom of the professors; this is similar to limiting, by not giving credit for, research related
to ID); Keen, 970 F.2d at 257 ("This Court has recognized the supremacy of the academic
institution in matters of curriculum content."); Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1075 (noting that university
officials may control the curriculum decisions, likely including ones involving what research
will be credited within the department); Scallet, 911 F. Supp. at 1011 (recognizing that the
schools have a right to determine their own curriculum which must be followed); Cooper, 472
F. Supp. at 809 ("[A] state university has the undoubted right to prescribe its curriculum, to
select its faculty and students and evaluate their performances, and to define and maintain its
standards of academic accomplishment."); see also Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262
(7th Cir. 1982). The court determined that, related to academic freedom, "it [is] clear that
whatever constitutional protection is afforded by the First Amendment extends as readily to
the scholar in the laboratory as to the teacher in the classroom." Id. at 1275. This proposition
may be read to support the cases above in the sense that the professors have a wide latitude
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peer review journals, get grants from (scientifically) credible granting institutions,
and/or get favorable peer review from scientists, there is no duty to support the
work. 54 It is not science. 5 5 One would not expect science departments to have to
fund research on ufology, why the Earth is flat, or why the Earth is the center of the
universe. The same is true for ID research. Departments could fund such research,
unless it would pose an Establishment Clause issue, but they need not, and are not
likely to, fund or reward such research. Of course, such research might be relevant
in religion or philosophy departments, an issue not addressed in this Article.
The question of tenure-revocation is quite different. First of all, there is a
question of tone. Denying credit to "junk science" is a refusal to give a carrot to those
who do not engage in serious scientific work, but revoking tenure is a punishment.
One is based on merit, whereas the other, even if arguably based on merit, is puni-
tive in nature and will be treated by courts as such.'5 6 The issue is not one that can
be addressed in broad terms.
First, there is the fact that various states and public universities have different
tenure-revocation policies.'57 Second, there is the practical reality that tenure-
revocation is a rare occurrence and is not generally based on research alone. As a
general matter, "for cause" tenure-revocation has occurred where there is a complete
lack of performance-that is, a failure to meet duties in teaching, scholarship, and
service, as opposed to failing to fulfill responsibilities in just one category.158 Even
then, there is generally notice and an opportunity for the faculty member to improve
performance as well as general due process rights. 59 Other cases may involve extreme
malfeasance by a faculty member such as embezzlement, significant plagiarism,
significant criminal conduct, and the like."W
Assuming the faculty member is meeting his or her teaching duties with the
caveats discussed in Part I.B and meeting service requirements (usually involving
committee work), tenure-revocation would appear more like punishment for the
faculty member's religious and/or political views. This is not a valid basis to revoke
tenure. If, on the other hand, a faculty member refuses to teach his or her courses or
refuses to teach them without including ID, and that faculty member engages pri-
marily in ID research-which does not help, and may hurt, a science department's
reputation-tenure-revocation would be a possibility; but even then it would depend
within their research area but cannot simply research outside subjects like ID (just as they
cannot simply teach ID) without university approval of the curriculum/research.
"5 See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 737-38, 744-45 (M.D.
Pa. 2005).
"' Id. at 735-46; see supra Part I.A.
156 See POSKANZER, supra note 151, at 208-17.
'7 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
158 See POSKANZER, supra note 151, at 208-13.
15' Euben & Lee, supra note 150, at 301-03.
160 POSKANZER, supra note 151, at 211-17.
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on university policies, and due process would certainly be required. The reason for
revocation would be failure to perform even the basic requirements of the job,
however, and not the faculty member's belief in ID.
The above dichotomy between the requirements for refusal to support and reward
ID work and revoking tenure makes sense when one views the former as refusal of
support and the latter as punishment. There are a number of cases that demonstrate
the distinction between the government's ability to grant or deny support to activities
performed on behalf of the government and the government's ability to punish the
private speech of government employees on matters relevant to public discourse. 6'
While ID theorists are likely to argue that denial of research support is punishment,
given that the government can choose what speech to fund on its own behalf, the case
law is not on their side.'62 Nor, for that matter, is common sense. While the refusal
to fund could be seen as punishment at some level, it is different in kind than revok-
ing rights already given. If the former is considered punishment for speech activity
rather than failure to support speech the public institution does not wish to support
with its name and money, public universities would arguably be required to fund
and/or reward anything and everything that a faculty member claims to be research,
including astrology, alchemy, flat earth theory, and Raelian "science." While a great
deal of leeway should be given for research topics in any academic institution, one can
see in this argument the long shadow of science departments having to fund research
in alchemy, astrology, and flat earth theory. Thus, while great leeway should be given
to research topics, that leeway is not limitless, especially in fields with relatively
accessible disciplinary boundaries.
1I. ID IN PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The primary Establishment Clause concern regarding ID in science departments
at public universities involves teaching ID. Support for research may also be an issue,
but as will be seen, the teaching of ID poses a far more significant problem under the
Establishment Clause. The Bishop court relied, in part, on the university's justified
fear of religious endorsement and coercion when it upheld the university's right to
preclude Professor Bishop from teaching a religious approach in his exercise physi-
ology class.'6 3 An important implication was that this was a general science class
and not an upper level seminar and that it was a science class, as opposed to a class
161 Compare Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (government
as speaker), and Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (same), with United States v. Nat'l
Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995) (public employee speech); and Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (same); and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (same);
and Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (same).
162 See sources cited supra note 161.
163 Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074, 1076-77 (1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1218
(1992).
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in religion or philosophy. 64 These concerns were also echoed in Kitzmiller 65 Since
ID was found not to be science and to be a religiously based approach, the Kitzmiller
court held that allowing even a disclaimer in a science textbook would create endorse-
ment problems."6 Of course, Kitzmiller involved secondary schools and not the
college or university setting. 167 Bishop engages similar reasoning in the university
context, but the Establishment Clause issue was not directly before the court. Rather,
it was one of the University of Alabama's reasons for precluding the religious mate-
rial in the science class. 16 Thus, it is worth briefly analyzing the question under the
tests generally used in education situations under the Establishment Clause.
The tests that have been applied in these situations are the endorsement test, 169
the coercion test,17 and the Lemon test (as combined with endorsement analysis or
as a separate analysis).' 7 ' As will be seen, teaching ID in science classes, as op-
posed to philosophy or religion courses, does raise significant Establishment Clause
problems, while research support for individual researchers (if any credible science
department would provide it) does not. The obvious reason for this is the difference
between classroom and "scholarly" contexts. 172
When one registers for a course in the science curriculum, one does not expect
to have religious positions on creation thrust upon oneself. 173 Once one is registered
for the course, it may be hard to withdraw for any number of reasons. 174 If the pro-
fessor imposes his or her religious views on the scientific subject matter of the course
or, for religious reasons, skews his or her teaching so as to create a false impression
that a generally scientific approach is invalid, there are clear problems of endorsement
and coercion. 175
In the endorsement context the question is whether the purpose or effect of the
government actor's actions endorses religion or a particular religion and makes
164 Id.
65 Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
'66 Id. at 723-35.
167 Id. at 708-09.
'6' Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1076-77.
"6 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Edwards v. Aguilard, 482 U.S.
578 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707.
170 Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290; Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
7' Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290; Edwards, 482 U.S. 578; Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707.
172 The classroom involves a captive audience setting, Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), and the professor at a public university is a state employee.
Scholarship is generally engaged in by the professor, perhaps with help from research and lab
assistants who can choose to apply for a position. Cf. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1076-77 (indicating
that a professor's independent research may be free of university control).
173 Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1074, 1076-77 (discussing possibility of students feeling coerced).
174 id.
175 See id.; Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 714-35 (providing an example of endorsement
in high school setting).
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religious outsiders feel like outsiders in the political community or religious insiders
feel favored. 176 The purpose aspect of this analysis is not as easy at it may appear
at first glance. The first question that needs to be asked is whose purpose are we
looking at: the professor or the university? If the professor is teaching ID as a valid
theory and one looks to the professor's purpose, there would be a strong case that the
professor's purpose is to endorse religion. 17 7 The professor would be teaching, as
valid, a religious theory that is not scientific, and any argument that doing so promotes
secular pedagogical purposes in a science classroom is inadequate once ID material
is taught as science. 7 1 If anything, teaching ID as a valid scientific theory in a science
classroom would go against secular pedagogical purposes. 179
If one looks at the public university, however, the question would be whether
the university had any purpose to endorse religion in offering the course or allowing
it to be taught after having received complaints. As a general matter, there would
appear to be a secular purpose under either circumstance. Certainly, offering science
courses has a secular purpose, and even if the university is aware of concerns regard-
ing ID it may allow the course to continue based on the university's sense of academic
freedom rather than an intent to endorse religion. This issue is of little import, how-
ever, because teaching ID as valid scientific theory in a science classroom would
violate the effects element of the endorsement test. 0
As the Edwards, Bishop, and Kitzmiller courts all note, the effect of teaching
religious theories of creation in a secular science classroom is to promote or endorse
religion.' 8 ' Using the podium of a state university science department to promote a
religious theory of origins that has been rejected by the broader scientific community
is an endorsement of religion. As the Bishop court explained, it could make students
feel that they must "take it" or have their grades affected, 82 and as the Kitzmiller court
explained, it can create a false sense of scientific views on central issues in students
who do not have a strong grounding in biology, chemistry, etc."8 3
176 Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 309-10; Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,688 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
177 Cf. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1076-77 (addressing a university's potential concern that
Bishop's religious messages in the course could create an "appearance of proselytizing by
a professor").
178 See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707.
179 See id.
180 Cf. id. at 714-28 (dealing with a disclaimer regarding evolution and ID in high school
science sources).
181 Id.; Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (considering the elementary and second-
ary school context); Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1076-77 (noting this would be a valid concern for
a university).
182 Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1074, 1076-77.
"83 Cf. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 724-29 (discussing the potential of disclaimer to
evolution in textbooks to mislead students).
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Certainly, those who do not share the narrow Christian views promoted by ID 114
would be made to feel like outsiders in the political community and those who sup-
port that view like insiders.'85 This would be the effect of teaching the material as
valid scientific theory in a science course--either promoting ID or using its concepts
to attack evolution-regardless of whether one views the speaker as the professor
or the university. 8 6 Many students, even college-aged students, may not separate the
message from the professor and the university.'87
Moreover, if the university allows ID teaching to continue after complaints by
students, as would generally be the case if the courts became involved, the effect of
teaching ID would be even more intense regardless of the university's reasons for not
acting to prevent ID in the science curriculum. The above analysis would also be
applicable under the first two prongs of the Lemon test-whether the government
entity has a secular purpose and whether the primary effect of the relevant govern-
ment action is to advance or inhibit religion. 88 The third prong of the Lemon test
might also be implicated based on the political divisiveness these issues raise, but
the current role of this element is up in the air, and at any rate it is unnecessary be-
cause the purpose and effect elements would have been violated.'89
The Establishment Clause makes the public university's role in limiting the
teaching of ID in science courses mandatory. The likely argument in defense of
allowing ID based on free exercise and/or free speech is doomed to failure because,
as noted above in Part I.B, the university has the ability to preclude ID theory from
being taught in the science curriculum. Thus, there are no free speech or free exer-
cise rights involved because there is no unlimited right to teach whatever one wants
regardless of curricular needs or academic merit.' 90 The same would be true for the
teaching of astrology, alchemy, or ufology in the science curriculum, except that
since these theories are not generally religious in nature there would be no duty to
preclude the material (of course, no science department would likely allow that mate-
rial to be taught as valid science). The one exception on this latter point might be
8 See id. at 714-45.
185 See id. at 723-35 (examining the possible interpretation of the disclaimer at issue on
the objective child and adult).
186 Cf id. at 714-45 (holding that teaching or referring in disclaimer to ID as valid scientific
theory endorses religion in high school context); Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1074, 1076-77 (noting
that endorsement or promotion of religion is a valid concern when professor uses religious
approach in teaching secular science course).
187 Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1074, 1076-77.
188 See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 746--64.
189 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 582-83 (1987) (finding that any one
prong of the Lemon test is adequate to demonstrate an Establishment Clause violation under
that test); ACLU of N.J. v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1488 (3d Cir.
1996) (en banc) (holding that there was no need to address the entanglement prong of Lemon
when other prong(s) are met).
190 See supra Part I.B.
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religious versions of ufology, such as the Raelians, 191 which are not generally part of
the "mainstream" ufology community. 192 To the extent such religious motivations
are the reason for teaching the material, and assuming a university would consider
allowing it in a science classroom, the same Establishment Clause analysis would
apply as applies to ID theory. 93
Finally, courts might apply the indirect coercion test to these situations. That test
requires that the government sponsor a religious exercise that obliges the partici-
pation of objectors.' 94 The teaching of ID as science in a science classroom would
certainly oblige the participation of objectors who may not be able to drop the course
without significant concerns and, if the course is required for any reason, may not be
able to drop it at all.195 The government certainly sponsors the class, and a state actor
is the one promoting the religious theory on state property, using state equipment,
while being paid by the state. The only question would be whether teaching ID theory
would be seen as a "religious exercise." Given that ID promotes central tenets of
Christianity and would be taught to a captive audience in the classroom, it is likely
that most courts confronting the issue would find it to be a religious exercise. The
age of the students, which can be important under the indirect coercion test,' 96 would
not preclude the application of that test here because even though the students would
be college-aged, as in Bishop, they are a captive audience being taught by a state
employee. 97 As noted above, when one enrolls in a science class, one expects that
one will be taught science, and that religion, if involved at all, will not be taught as
science.'98 One might seek such discussion in philosophy of science, philosophy
generally, religion, or maybe even in history of science courses.
CONCLUSION
This Article addresses questions that arise when ID theory is brought into science
departments at public universities. When one evaluates the case law, philosophy
of science, and the substance of modem science, it becomes clear that ID is not a
'1' For information on the Raelian cult, including the Raelian argument for alien "intelligent
design," see The Raelian Movement, http://www.rael.org/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2008).
192 Susan Palmer, The Raelian Movement International, in NEW RELIGIONS AND THE NEW
EUROPE 194, 200 (Robert Towler ed., 1995).
9 See supra Part I.B.
'9 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301-07 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577 (1992).
'9' Cf Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1068-69, 1074, 1076-77 (lth Cir. 1991)
(addressing potential coercion from a religious approach to a general science course).
'9 Weisman, 505 U.S. 593.
'9 Cf Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1074, 1076-77 (noting potential coercion when a religious
approach is used in university science class).
198 See id. at 1069 (discussing student complaints regarding religious approach in a
science course).
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scientific theory. The case law, at least, along with statements and documents from
the ID movement, makes it clear that ID is a religiously motivated theory. This
Article asserts that as a result of both this and the law governing academic freedom
and university curricular control, public universities and science departments may
preclude ID from being taught in science classes. Establishment Clause concerns
could make this "may" a "must."
Academic research is another matter. This Article asserts that the general
standards of science departments, which include peer review, publication, and grant
requirements, would enable a public university science department to deny tenure,
research support, merit increases, and other forms of support and recognition to
those whose research focuses on ID. There would be no need to go beyond those
standards if they are not met. Tenure revocation, however, is far more unlikely and
is not warranted where the professor is adequately performing his or her other duties
(including teaching, as outlined above). Of course, such teaching and research may
be recognized and supported in philosophy or religion departments should universities
choose to do so.
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